I. The Primacy Objection
On presuppositionalism, there is a strong connection between epistemic starting points and metaphysical starting points. This is to say, according to Van Tillian presuppositionalism, one must not only hold that God is the metaphysical starting point, but also that he is the epistemic starting point in order to have a worldview which accounts for intelligibility.
Presuppositionalists often try to derive God’s epistemic primacy from his ontic primacy. Given that all Christians grant his ontic primacy, in the sense that God originates all that exists, then this sort of derivation, if successful, would be a significant step towards establishing the view of presuppositionalists. This sort of derivation also underlies the presuppositionalist critique of classical apologetics. Classicists, in taking their epistemic starting point to be something other than God, are seen by presuppositionalists to be somehow violating the idea that God is ontically primary. This derivation of God's epistemic primacy from his ontic primacy also underlies the presuppositionalists critique of views on which there are multiple starting points of reasoning given to all humans, such as reason and sense-perception. So defeating the derivation would be of great significance and would undermine the presuppositionalist’s project.
To disentangle the Van Tillian’s position, let's imagine a possible world called W1.
W1: In this world, God creates individuals who must come to believe in him by surveying various evidences. God has built these individuals in such a way that they don’t just believe in his existence automatically.
Perhaps W1 differs from our world. People like Sproul and other classical apologists don’t think that it does differ, believing that our world just is W1. I myself don’t think that our world is like this. I think belief in God can be rational apart from argument and evidence. But despite this, it still seems possible for God to have created such a world like W1, and even in that world God is the metaphysical starting point though he isn’t the epistemic starting point.
So what’s the takeaway from the possibility of W1? First, the possibility of W1 shows that even granting that God is primary in the sense that he creates and sustains all things does not, by itself, imply that God is primary in our epistemology. Second, it opens up the path to see that God could have possibly created us with a multiplicity of starting points, a path which we’ll expand upon below. Third, it shows that there’s nothing inherently impious in working with arguments that don’t clearly presuppose the existence of God, as residents of W1 would not be sinfully autonomous by reasoning from evidences, as this is something that God designed them to do—and thus W1 undermines the sinful-autonomy charge often leveled by the presuppositionalist against the classicist. We can also see that the possibility (and, in Sproul’s mind, actuality) of W1 underscores Sproul’s assertion here:
Relying upon our reason and sense-experience is not the same thing as self-legislation. Rather, this autonomy is part of our composition. Whoever made us intended that we operate according to these laws which we find within us. These laws are given to us, not created by us. The concept of (sinful) moral autonomy is not contained within the concept of reasoned autonomy.
II. The Multiplicity of Starting Points Objection
By multiplicity of starting points I mean to refer to the following thesis:
MSP Thesis: Each human possesses a plurality of basic starting points from which they can reason. None of these starting points is more basic or prior to the others. Possible candidates would include sense-perception, the sensus divinitatis, and reason.
There are three relevant (at least for our purposes here) positions to take in regard to whether there are a multiplicity of starting points for human reasoning.
(a) Yes—and the belief in God’s existence is not among the starting points. We must reason from the starting points to the belief in God’s existence in order for the belief to be rational. Sproul represents this option.
(b) No—there is only one single starting point, and that’s the presupposition that God exists. Presuppositionalism represents this option. (Though there are some complications with how we should construe circularity, but we can pass over that here)
(c) Yes—and belief in God’s existence is among the starting points, but is not the sole starting point. Reformed Epistemology represents this option.
If we opt for (c), as I think we should, we can tell a very plausible and appealing story: We possess reasoning faculties, the tools of logic, sense-experience, the sensus divinitatis, and so on. These basic beliefs represent different starting points, and none are to be construed as ultimate as is the case in Presuppositionalism. This commitment to a multiplicity of starting points grounds the instrumental use of reason in theology as well as the Scriptural injunctions to validate revelation through the sensory-experience of miracles.
We can see such an appeal to the MSP Thesis in verses such as 2 Peter 1:16:
For we did not follow cleverly contrived myths when we made known to you the power and coming of our Lord Jesus Christ; instead, we were eyewitnesses of his majesty.
Peter is cross verifying the gospel message with being an eyewitness, which protects the gospel from being thought of as a mere myth.
But it’s also clear that (c) permits belief in God to be properly basic, as something that can be rationally believed apart from evidence. It thus allows us to know God in an immediate way, but still permits us to demonstrate his existence to others using the other starting points. The sensus divinitatis is how we know that God exists, yet we can still show that he exists using reason and arguments.
III. The Interrelations Doctrine
Van Til, in concert with the tradition of Idealism, espouses a doctrine known as the doctrine of internal relations. Van Til gave the doctrine a particular sort of epistemic bend. He holds that truth is inter-connected in such a way that a person must know all things truly in order to know one thing truly. He applied this doctrine to his analysis of knowledge. For a fact to be known truly (Van Til’s term), he held that the agent must know the fact in all of its relations, specifically in relationship to God. This does not mean, for Van Til, that a person must be omniscient to have true knowledge - but it does mean that they must have the correct presuppositions to possess true knowledge. Only a Christian can know a fact truly.
Unbelievers, on the other hand, if they worked out all of their presuppositions, would be shown to have nothing whatsoever in common with believers - they would know nothing at all. They can only possess relative knowledge (again, his term) insofar as they unwittingly rely on Christian presuppositions. Van Til’s analysis is, to say the least, convoluted. I have virtually no idea how to state the analysis coherently nor do I know how to motivate each of the claims, but neither did Van Til.
There’s an alternative analysis of knowledge, an analysis acceptable to most analytic philosophers, and, I think, more acceptable to common-sense than Van Til’s:
Knowledge: An agent can be said to possess knowledge of p if the agent possesses a justified true belief+ (JTB+) that p.
Using this definition, we’ll be able to get some light on where Van Til goes wrong in the next section.
IV. Ontic-Epistemic Confusion
The doctrine of internal relations is another one of the paths that leads to the ontic-epistemic confusion that’s so rampant in the presuppositionalist community.
Consider one type of common presuppositional mantra:
Mantra: Any thought that doesn’t have the Triune God behind it is ultimately irrational.
Mantra is ambiguous between:
(a) Any thought of those that reject God is irrational. (Epistemic Claim)
or,
(b) If God were to not exist, then all thoughts would be irrational. (Ontic Claim)
(a) concerns how people have knowledge. It claims that if a person rejects God in their minds then they possess no knowledge whatsoever. (b) concerns something out there in the world that’s independent of our mental life—God’s existence and his creation of the world which enables us to have knowledge. The mantra better mean (b), because (a) seems clearly false using the definition of knowledge provided above, as will be shown.
Using the previous definition of knowledge as a guide, a person possesses knowledge if they have a belief that is true, i.e., is actually the case, and if that belief is justified in some way. Justification can be attained via a variety of means--either by evidence, or by testimony, or if the belief is a result of a reliable process, or some other truth-conducive process.
With this short definition of knowledge in mind, we can ask: May a person that rejects God possess knowledge? Sure they can. Say that an atheist believes that it’s 2:00 AM. So he meets the belief requirement. Further, it’s true that it’s 2:00 AM. So his belief meets the truth requirement. Further, the clock telling him that it’s 2:00 AM is reliable. So the belief meets the justified requirement. So he possesses knowledge. That's it. He’s got knowledge. The atheist doesn’t need to first know that God sustains the world in existence or that God created the world in order to know it’s 2:00 AM, the atheist merely needs the elements above. So it’s false that if we reject God that we cannot know anything, so (a) is false.
(b), on the other hand, is perfectly acceptable. It underlies the use of TAG arguments in apologetics and is not the special and unique provenance of presuppositionalists alone.
V. Undefeatable Presuppositions?
John Frame gives a handy definition of presupposition that I’ll repeat:
Presupposition: (1) a belief that precedes other beliefs; (2) a belief that governs other beliefs; (3) ultimate presupposition: the belief that governs all other beliefs, or the most fundamental commitment of the heart.
According to Presuppositionalism, presuppositions cannot be defeated as they establish their own criteria of rationality. They can, perhaps, be defeated by nonlogical factors such as the testimony of the Holy Spirit. Facts aren’t neutral, according to Van Til. All facts are interpreted facts.
On the contrary: Just because the unbeliever is not neutral doesn’t mean that evidence isn’t neutral. And merely because facts are interpreted doesn’t mean that we can’t become aware that they’re interpreted. Presuppositions can be made known, worked through, and to some extent marginalized.
One common counter to my response here is the following idea: Paul and Jesus both argue that the mind which has not been made spiritual by the Spirit cannot comprehend spiritual things. Therefore, the presuppositions of the unbeliever cannot be defeated by reason and introspection lest Pelagianism threatens. But there’s an easy response to this objection.
VI. The Believing Demon Counter-Objection
Consider the faith of demons in James 2:19. The demons both know the truth of the gospel and that God exists, and they do so in an unregenerate way. So it’s possible to come to a knowledge of the truth without being saved. A person that is unregenerate can advance in knowledge of God's nature, affirming that he exists, that Jesus died for our sins, the whole gambit, and not be regenerate. This certainly isn’t a form of Pelagianism.
Yet a true spiritual understanding of all these things is the prerogative of the Holy Spirit alone. And this truth accounts for the instinct behind the last section’s objection.
We might rightly ask what the value of mere historical faith consists in. So what if there’s a sense in which the unregenerate can know the truth of the gospel—they’re not thereby saved by it. We can say a few things in response to this. First, it’s the Holy Spirit’s prerogative alone to save individuals. We are merely told to spread the truth and message of the gospel. We share the gospel, teach theology, sing hymns, and reason about our faith. We can do no more. The Holy Spirit can choose to use any one of these things to convict a sinner, and we should not limit the means available to him. There are many examples of true believing Christians that were brought to faith by the Holy Spirit using the evidences to make them aware and to convict them. We shouldn’t unduly cut off a viable path of ministry.
VII. Objecting to the No-Neutrality Charge
The Presuppositionalists hold that there is no neutral ground between a believer and an unbeliever, that there is no point at which a belief can be arbitrated from assumptions acceptable to both the Christian and unbeliever: “Presuppositional apologists claim that there is no neutrality.” Unbelievers, according to this concept, view everything under the presupposition of atheism - and, given the doctrine of internal relations, therefore know nothing truly and therefore have no ground on which to stand.
To reject this position, we merely have to adopt the MSP Thesis and granular theory of knowledge sketched above. An unbeliever can possess JTB+ without knowing the relations of the object of their knowledge. Further, as shown by the MSP Thesis, an unbeliever does share some starting points with us, such as that of reason and sense-experience.
In holding to the above concept of neutrality with respect to believers and unbelievers we are not denying the non-neutrality of the sinner's heart to evidence. Rather, we are merely urging that there are potential starting points acceptable to both the believer and unbeliever that do not require either side to embrace the views of their opponent. For instance, we may employ arguments that attempt to gauge the probability of God’s existence from a particular set of data that does not include God’s existence among the set.
VIII. The Non-Circular Justification Objection
In Van Til’s words:
To admit one's own presuppositions and to point out the presuppositions of others is therefore to maintain that all reasoning is, in the nature of the case, circular reasoning. The starting-point, the method, and the conclusion are always involved in one another.
It’s difficult to understand quite what Til is meaning to teach here. He wasn’t a rigorous epistemologist and may be using “circular reasoning” in an idiosyncratic way. Regardless, one common understanding is that he’s endorsing the use of circular reasoning using a sort of ad hominem maneuver: Circular reasoning is unavoidable, so we’re permitted to use it.
On its best face, Van Til may be taken to be endorsing a sort of Coherentist epistemology on which all beliefs in a web are justified by other beliefs. But Coherentism isn’t popular for good reason: There are clear cases of justified beliefs that do not receive their justification from another belief. Take the example of I have a headache. This belief isn’t justified by inference and isn’t based on another belief. It receives its justification immediately from a state of experience. So Coherentism is false, as is Til’s contention. There are other cases of beliefs that are justified in a non-circular way. The atheist’s belief that it’s 2:00 AM is an example of a non-circularly justified belief as well.
IX. Misc.
Some good points from a friend:
I think a good defeater for presuppositionalists is asking if an unbeliever without Scripture must consciously "presuppose the Triune God" before they can arrive at any justified true belief.
Most of the smart ones will deny that the unbeliever has to do this sort of presupposing, which proves the point that they're really talking about ontology, not epistemology, when they mention "presupposing."
The other place you can press them is to ask what "knowledge" of God is like if it's necessarily logically prior to the reception of the law of identity, the law of NC, and self awareness in the prospective human knower.
