Introduction
Connecting the necessary being of the Cosmological Argument (CA) to the God of theism is a difficult task, one more difficult than the CA itself. There are two ways to go about bridging the gap between the necessary being to God:
a) Conceptual analysis of what properties the necessary cause must or is most likely to possess using general tools of reason.
b) Arguments from the effects of the necessary cause; such as fine-tuning, the origin of consciousness, and so on.
And then to conclude from these two methods that the necessary cause is or shares properties with the God of theism.
This post will be concerned with method a) above. I think one way to advance the discussion is to consider three possibilities for how the necessary cause explains the rest of reality. For our purposes, we’ll refer to this explanation-relation as creation. The following will discuss three models of creation. It should become clear in the course of the discussion that this label does not beg the question against those that take the necessary cause to be impersonal or other-than-God.
The Three Models of Creation
i. Creatio ex Materia (CEM)
The first option we’ll consider is CEM, which has two variants:
Variant 1: The necessary cause uses pre-existing material to fashion the universe.
Variant 2: The necessary cause is, in some sense, the material out of which the contingent universe is crafted.
Starting with Variant 1, we can ask: If the necessary cause must use pre-existing material in order to create, is this pre-existing material also necessary? It seems so, and if so, then this pre-existing material threatens to be a necessary thing (or stuff) alongside that of the necessary being arrived at by way of the CA. Let’s call the necessary being arrived at by the CA NB1 and the necessary material out of which it fashions NB2.
Historically, the strongest motivator for CEM is the ex nihilo nihil fit principle, specifically in regards to the seeming requirement that all things require a pre-existing material cause in order to exist. For a jar to come about, there first has to exist the clay out of which the jar is made (the clay is the material cause in this case). Let’s call this the ENNF-M Principle, which holds:
ENNF-M: For anything to exist, there must be a prior material cause out of which that thing is fashioned.
This principle is how the ancients motivated their eternally existent matter, and in this they’re joined by some modern philosophers (Filipe Leon). If all things require a prior material cause before they can exist, then creatio ex nihilo is ruled out tout court.
Still, it seems like there may be a way to simplify the doctrine. This would be Variant 2. Rather than using and fashioning contingent reality out of a necessarily existing substratum, perhaps the necessary cause is itself that substratum out of which contingent things are fashioned. This would allow CEM to reduce the entities required for the theory, shaving off NB2, while still upholding ENNF-M. So only NB1 obtains necessarily and contingent affairs arise out of, are aspects of, are parts of, or whatever, of NB1.
It should be clear that Variant 2 of CEM is just the idea that the universe itself, or its material substratum, is the necessary being. It’s an acceptance of Hume’s proposal that the universe play the role of necessary cause.
It’s at this point that we begin to fulfill the promise of the introduction and probe the properties of NB1. There are three tools in particular that I want to use in this project, inspired by the philosopher Joshua Rasmussen. Let’s call these tools Rasmussen’s Toolset, which includes arguments from uniformity, simplicity, and explanatory depth. With these, we'll begin to bridge the gap from NB1 to the God of theism.
The argument from uniformity:
1. All limits that we know of are dependent on other things for an explanation.
2. The necessary cause is not-dependent.
3. So we have good reason to think that NB1 does not have limits.
I think this sort of reasoning is defeasible, but still weighty. All limits that we observe in nature are dependent. For instance: a mountain range that has only two peaks is dependent upon an explanation of plate tectonics, erosion, and so on. A mountain range with 2000 peaks also would be dependent upon such an explanation. This point seems generalizable to all limits, all of which seem to require an explanation. But we don’t have any cases of a limitless being requiring an explanation. We should conclude from this that NB1 is limitless.
The argument from simplicity:
Arbitrary limits are less simple If NB1 just has the power to produce 1009 particles, this would seem arbitrary and brute, so it’s a complexifying factor. It requires a reason to posit the power as well as a reason to posit the limit to the power. Each limit adds complexity to a theory since each limit requires additional information to describe the theory.
By the tool of simplicity, then, a theory of a limitless NB1 is more internally likely. In other words, the tool of simplicity provides another reason to think the NB1 lacks arbitrary limits.
The argument from explanatory depth:
If the necessary cause is to have maximum explanatory power, then it must be simple and lack arbitrary limits. For if it had an arbitrary limit, there would be no more fundamental thing that could explain the limit. So to have full explanatory power, the NB1 must be simple, and it’s this simplicity that allows for it to explain all things with limits and complexity.
The argument from explanatory depth gives us the best possible explanation for the rest of reality.
These three tools of reason—uniformity, simplicity, and explanatory depth—all converge on one conclusion—that NB1, which on CEM, is the material substratum, must lack limits. What can we draw from this point? First, it seems that CEM is going to need modification. For on any plausible story we can tell about material or matter, it’s going to have a number of arbitrary limits. It’s limited to certain dimensions. It extends in only certain ways. It can be divided up and separated. And so on. Each of these seem like an arbitrary limit. So this pushes us to think that the “material” cause isn’t material after all.
Let’s continue down this path. Consider powers. Does the necessary cause have limited power? Lacking a certain power would be a limit, and Rasmussen’s toolset led us to reject the idea that NB1 has limits. The power to know things is a power. So we have good reason to think that NB1 has the power to know things. Only minds have the power to know. So NB1 is or has a mind.
Here are the steps so far:
1. The necessary cause has maximum power and has no limits. (As shown by Rasmussen’s Toolset)
2. The power to know something is a power. If something did not have the power to know something, then it would be limited.
3. So the NB1 has the power to know something.
4. Only minds have the power to know something.
5. So NB1 has or is a mind.
Rasmussen’s Toolset points us towards an agential substratum. Applying these tools to Variant 2 of CEM seems to push it towards Creatio ex Deo, which is our next topic.
ii. Creatio ex Deo (CED)
We’ve seen that CEM transforms into Creatio ex Deo (CED) with the application of Rasmussen’s tools. It should be noted that CED is closely aligned with either pantheism or panentheism, depending upon how it’s fleshed out. Rasmussen’s toolset pushes away from pantheism and towards a panentheistic view of ex deo. So we’ll pursue that line.
Towards building an objection to CED, consider that there seem to be a diverse array of things in the world, things that are really distinct from one another. I’m not you, for instance, and my cat isn’t either of us. Let’s call this the Plurality Thesis:
Plurality Thesis (PT): There are distinct objects that exist in the world.
Monism would be a denial of PT. PT is so enormously plausible that I take it we need a very compelling reason to abandon it. So we’ll work from it.
Why is PT a problem for CED? Because CED seems to imply that the divine material substratum is capable of being parsed up in various ways. The various distinct things that exist are made out of a divine sort of stuff. Remember, we’re still working with a substratum theory, just of a divine sort. This capacity for being parsed is problematic for reasons of divine simplicity. This is a point noted by Oliver Crisp in his essay against mereological panentheism, but he failed to spell out the philosophical motivations and, somewhat dismissively, referred to it as a theological consideration only. To remedy Crisps’s defect, we’re going to see how a weak version of simplicity can be motivated easily on philosophical grounds and that this shows a clear philosophical disadvantage for CED.
Here’s the point a bit more clearly: If the divine substance can make up a plurality of things, then it must be capable of being parsed up and divided. But if it’s capable of being parsed up and divided, then it seems very plausible to ask why it’s unified and simple in the first place. In the words of Pruss:
It is at least plausible that if something has parts, then it makes sense to ask why these parts are united. If so, then the existence of a being with parts cannot be self-explanatory. The same is true of what one might call “metaphysical parts”, like distinct powers, tropes, etc. If we suppose that the First Cause’s existence is self-explanatory, rather than explained in terms of some further metaphysical principles, then we might well conclude that there cannot be any composition in the First Cause.
Pruss is drawing on Rasmussen’s Toolset in this passage. The ability of NB1 to be parsed seems to require a prior complexity in NB1’s nature. Complexities at the ground floor of reality hurt explanatory power, simplicity, and uniformity. So the toolset points us towards thinking that NB1 cannot be parsed.
So the very toolset that collapsed CEM into CED now leads us away from CED. What’s left on the table?
iii. Creatio ex Nihilo (CEN)
Our two options: Variant 1 and Variant 2 of CEM, with Variant 2 transforming into CED with Rasmussen’s toolset. Both options can be motivated by the ENNF-M principle. But CED has a clear disadvantage if Monism is denied—it returns to a violation of the toolset.
Variant 1 can uphold the ENNF-M doctrine and keep the necessary cause separate from the material substratum, thereby not violating the toolset. But it seems like we should shave off the material substrate if possible, and it looks like Rasmussen’s Toolset would strive to eliminate it as well.
Creatio ex Nihilo (CEN), however, doesn’t face such a pressure. To see why, let’s look at the distinctive thesis of CEN:
Strong Distinctness Thesis: The necessary cause can create really distinct things without using a material cause.
CEN depends on a rejection of the ENNF-M doctrine. Some philosophers (Leon and the ancient Greeks) have argued that this is a costly move. The same sort of empirical considerations that support the more fundamental ENNF doctrine also support, or seem to support, the ENNF-M doctrine. But it’s plausible that the universal necessary cause may violate it, and it doesn’t seem incoherent for a violation to occur. CEN can preserve ENNF.
We may bring in Perfect Being (PB) consideration at this stage. It seems better to be capable of creating ex nihilo than to require a material cause in order to create. So we have PB reasons to think that the necessary cause has this ability.
Still, I think it’s clear that the CEN has an edge over Variant 1. Maybe it doesn’t amount to a demonstration. William Lane Craig seems to admit as much.
