Field Guide for Pro-Lifers:

Here are some steps to a dialectic for arguing against the permissibility of abortion: 

> I. What grounds a right to life? > II. Propose Consciousness > III. Come up with intractable counter-examples to proposal > IV. Search for criteria that canvasses counter-examples correctly > V. Animalism is the only criteria that does so > VI. Various other pro-life arguments

I think a very plausible way to argue against the permissibility of abortion is by first starting with the idea of consciousness as that property that grounds the right to life.  This seems initially quite plausible, right?  But when we proceed to cases, we begin to see that consciousness is much too flickery a property to ground an inviolable right to life.  

It’s step (III.) in the above dialectic that requires the most support.  So here’s some quick cases:

We possess a right to life even in deep sleep, and it would be wrong to kill us while we're in a deep sleep, despite our not displaying consciousness.

Imagine a man in a coma for 9 months that *will* wake up at the end of the 9 months.  Is it permissible to disconnect him? Presumably not.

Imagine an alien species that matures to adulthood but, every 5 years, returns to a fetal-egg state for 3 years.  After this 3 year period they reemerge as adults with their memories and consciousness.  Was it permissible to kill the aliens in their fetal-egg state? Presumably not. 

So consciousness does not ground a right to life.

One difference in the above examples vs. the abortion case is that of resumed memories.  In each of the above three cases the person had memories prior to their consciousness being paused.  So is it past-memories that grounds a right to life?  That seems wrong, too.  For consider the following modified case:  The man in the coma that *will* wake up in 9 months time will have lost all memories prior to his coma.  Is it now permissible to kill the man during the 9 month period?  Still, presumably not.  And if this is so, then it seems like consciousness or past-memories are not sufficient to canvass all the creatures that have a right to life.  

So what other possible criteria could we propose that would correctly canvass all the cases?  

The most plausible answer to this question, one that correctly canvasses all the cases, is the idea that our kind-membership gives us the right to life.  As long as we’re the sort of being that can normally be rational, conscious, moral-decision makers, etc., then we have a right to life.  Notice that this criteria is a sort of second-order property.  It isn’t consciousness itself that gives the right to life, but membership in a *kind* that normally is capable of consciousness.  So while the sleeping person doesn’t currently exercise consciousness, they’re the sort of being that are usually capable of it.  The same reasoning applies to the coma case, as well as the alien case--and, I think, to the human fetus.

One more line of reasoning is useful here.  It’s the question of what sort of beings we are--what are we, as humans?  Animalism holds that we are our human animal.  C.S. Lewis was wrong:  We aren’t souls that possess bodies.  We're human animals that have an immaterial part, our souls.

This point leads naturally to the question: When did *I* begin to exist? Well, if I’m my human animal, I began to exist when the animal that I am began to exist.  And when did the animal that I am begin to exist?  Science gives us one answer:  At conception.  Conception is not an arbitrary moment like birth.  Birth can occur at any point within a few month period.  It’s not a natural cutting point for when I began to exist.  Conception, on the other hand, is a clear-cut moment at which a new life with a new set of DNA begins to exist.   I was once a zygote.  And it’s wrong to kill me at all points of my existence.  The zygote possesses an intrinsic self-directed process that will not halt unless something extrinsically interferes with it.

I think there’s an allowed break at this point: Either our personhood is essential and grounds our right to life, in which we’re persons even when we’re sleeping, or our personhood is a non-essential property of us and it’s some other property that grounds our right to life--such as “we’re the kind of being that should have personhood under normal situations.”  I’m ambivalent on which path should be taken here. 

Supplementary Arguments:

These are just a hodge-podge of arguments that I won’t expand on for now.

The 95% strength to pro-choice arguments isn’t strong enough argument.

Maternal attitude argument.

No maiming fetus’s argument.

Right to life doesn't come in degrees, yet consciousness does.  So must be something that’s an either/or property.  Kind membership is either/or.

Each fetus deprived of life is a unique human animal that’s been deprived of life.

Causal Finitism

Causal Finitism (=CF) is a new and potent way in which to argue for Kalam-style Cosmological Arguments.  CF holds that events with infinite causal histories are impossible.  If this is so, then it’s an easy step to hold that the universe does not have a past infinity of events.

CF is usually argued for using Grim Reaper style paradoxes.

CF seems like a better route for establishing the finitude of the past given that it’s consistent with my preferred views of time.  The way in which WLC argues for the finitude of the past, using Hilbert’s Hotel, seems to rule out eternalism cum infinite after-life, for given both of these commitments it seems that an actual infinite would obtain and a fortiori be possible, contrary to the Hilbert Hotel style arguments.  These considerations push WLC towards a particular view of time:  The after-life is a mere potential infinite and never an actual one.  But this proposal doesn’t work on eternalism.

CF, on the other hand, is consistent with eternalism cum infinite after-life.  At no point in the after-life is there an event that has an infinite causal history.  

Side note:  We are not timeless in the afterlife.  We will have resurrected bodies that presumably can move and interact, which seems to imply time intervals.  We will presumably have a flow of consciousness too, with thoughts before and after, which seems to imply time intervals.

Some Thoughts on the Kalam

The Kalam’s key premise is that whatever begins to exist has a cause. This premise is strictly consistent with God’s existing in a past-infinite way (=PIW), for if he exists for an infinite period of time in the past, then he never came into being and thus has no cause.

It’s the manner in which the second major premise is established, that the universe began to exist, that can conflict with God existing PIW--specifically the arguments against an actual infinite.  If actual infinities are impossible, then God does not exist PIW.  Or, if past causal infinite series are impossible, then God does not exist PIW.  However, if the universe’s past finitude is established using merely scientific arguments, God existing PIW may be upheld.

These considerations lead WLC to reject God existing PIW.  God was timeless prior to creation but entered time at creation.  

A-theory holds that things literally come into being.  B-theory rejects this, instead adopting the idea that things have a beginning to their existence but do not come into being. 

Are Arguments for Theism Cases of Special Pleading?

Here's the charge:  Any deity proposed as a explanation is in fact not one, as declaring it to contain its own explanation is simply special pleading.

To diffuse the special-pleading charge, it's helpful to keep in mind the distinction between the use of the word "God" as a proper name and it's use as a position. For instance, the word "boss" is a position that could be occupied by a number of individuals, while the word "Daryl" is a proper name denoting just me.

When using the PSR to argue for a self-existent being we’re concerned with the sense of "God" as a position. The PSR, if correct, holds that it is necessary that some entity or other hold that position. 

In other words, in using theistic arguments we're not arguing that we have some deity in mind (who just so happens to be named "God") and that he must be exempt from contingency - rather, we're saying that, given the PSR, some being or other must fulfill the role of a concrete necessary immaterial being, that something occupies the position of God.

Creatio ex Nihilo

God exists necessarily, but he produces things freely, and the power of things is produced by God but is different from the divine power, and things themselves operate, although they have received their power to act.

- Leibniz

I. Introduction

Creatio ex nihilo (CEN) has recently come under heavy criticism from the philosopher Felipe Leon in his exchange with Joshua Rasmussen.  Rasmussen declined to defend CEN in the dialogue for the sake of greater focus on the arguments he did wish to defend.  While this is a good choice by Rasmussen in a discussion of that format, CEN nevertheless can and should be defended.  That’s the purpose of this post.

II. Leon’s Argument

Leon presents his reasoning as a sort of parity style argument.  Broadly, it goes something like this:  If one rejects the dictum that everything that exists requires a material cause, then one should also reject the PSR.  

In his own words:  

(IUC) It is metaphysically impossible for a concrete object to come into 

existence out of nothing, without any cause whatsoever.  (a version of the PSR)

(PMC) It is metaphysically impossible for a concrete object to come into existence by an efficient cause if it lacks a material cause. 

The thing to see is that PMC’ looks to be on an epistemic par with IUC. Both are self-evident (if either is), and both enjoy the support of universal experience. Moreover, neither principle is a strict logical truth (entailed by logical axioms), and so one can deploy the Humean gambit above to resist them both if one is so inclined. Given that IUC and PMC are in the same epistemological boat, therefore, it seems unprincipled and arbitrarily selective to accept one while rejecting the other. It therefore looks as though one should treat them similarly: either accept both, or use the Humean gambit to reject both

I think there’s a number of ways to go about motivating a rejection of this sort of alleged parity between the two principles. 

III.  Responses

a. Counterexamples:  Here’s one easy route of attack.  Reject that PMC enjoys the same sort of empirical support that IUC holds.  Perhaps there are cases in our experience where things arise without a material cause, though never without a cause or reason of some sort.  If such a case can be found, then IUC would hold while PMC would fail.  

Philosophers through the ages have in fact suggested a couple of items in our experience that may meet such a requirement.  First, the origin of human souls seems like it may be such a case.  If our souls are not material, not derived from the material of our parents' souls, and not pre-existent, then they seem to be created ex nihilo on the occasion that we come into existence.  This position has traditionally been the main position of Christian theologians.

Leibniz alleges another counter-example to the parity of empirical support for PMC and IUC.  

Spinoza places among fictions the dictum, “Something can be produced from nothing.”  But, in truth, modes which are produced, are produced from nothing.  Since there is no matter of modes, assuredly neither the mode, nor a part of it, has preexisted, but only another mode which has disappeared and to which this present one has succeeded.

This example requires further research into what Leibniz means by “modes” but seems promising.

b. Reasons for motivating an exception to PMC:  As we learned in a previous post, we should use Rasmussen’s toolset in probing the nature of the foundation or ultimate reason for reality.  One of the tools in the toolset is that of shaving off arbitrary limits.  Being incapable of creating ex nihilo seems like a limit, at least without further motivation.  So we should not think it impossible for the foundation to create things ex nihilo.  

One way to reject this move would be to try and argue that creatio ex nihilo is incoherent.  But it doesn’t seem to be incoherent, at least not logically.  So it’s difficult to motivate why we should think the foundation lacks the power to create ex nihilo.  

Furthermore, perfect being theology (PBT) bids us to ascribe to God whatever attribute is maximal or perfect.  It’s greater to be able to create ex nihilo than to not be able to create ex nihilo.  So we should ascribe to God the power to create ex nihilo for reasons of PBT.

c. IUC enjoys greater support from reason than does PMC:  IUC can be derived from more fundamental principles, while PMC cannot.  For instance, IUC can be derived from the very weak and plausible thesis: It is at least possible that all of contingent reality is caused by something, while no similar argument can be given for PMC.  Thus PMC and IUC are not on par.

Further, there’s been recent work trying to derive the PSR (or, IUC) from more fundamental principles by Stephen Harrop.  Leibniz himself seems to have attempted such a derivation on multiple occasions, despite his calling the PSR a “first principle.”  If such a derivation is possible, and if such a derivation is lacking in the case of PMC (which seems like the case), then the two principles are not on par.

d. The rejection of CEN pushes towards ex deo, and not necessarily ex materia:  As we saw in a prior post, accepting PMC pushes us towards ex deo creation.  But ex deo creation has a number of problems on its own.  First, it seems that the divine foundation is not capable of being parsed given motivations for divine simplicity.  It also seems that if we can motivate the Scholastic language of God as pure act, that God would have no potential for being so parsed.  So ex deo creation is not a route that we should take.

If CEN is rejected, the above reasoning pushes us back to the idea of God existing alongside a quiescent materia out of which he fashions the universe.  But given that this postulates two a se beings, God and materia, rather than just God, should make it a less favorable hypothesis if PMC can be rejected.  And given that we’ve seen that there’s good reasons to think that creatio ex nihilo is possible, that the foundation is capable of achieving it, that there may be actual cases of ex nihilo creation in our experience, and that rejecting PMC does not lead to a tit for tat rejection to the PSR given that the PSR can be motivated on more general grounds of reason, then I do not see why we would accept that God existed alongside an a se materia.  Creatio ex nihilo is fully rational and defensible, despite our arguments not giving us a full demonstration of it.  

e. Obscure metaphysical reasons for CEN:  Saurez in his disputation 20, which can be found online, offers a metaphysical argument for the actuality of CEN given general Aristotelian grounds.  I won’t try to duplicate the argument here.  Perhaps later.  It may be worth the research.  Leibniz’s metaphysical system may also be of help.  He held that we never observe any thing coming into existence.  All substances were created at the initial act of creation.  So there is in fact no empirical support for PMC, as we never witness anything coming to be.  Further, Leibniz’s rejection of primary matter may be relevant as well.  Not sure.