An argument adapted from Joshua Rasmussen for the conclusion that there must be a necessary concrete entity. Necessary in the sense of existing in all possible worlds, and concrete in the sense that this being possesses powers that can cause other things. The argument assumes a basic understanding of modal logic, but otherwise is simple to understand:
Start with the following very weak and plausible thesis: It is at least possible that all of contingent reality is caused by something.
1. Suppose that there is no concrete necessary being.
2. Then, it is impossible for a concrete necessary being to cause the beginning of all contingency. (This is because, if there is no necessary being, then it is not possible for there to be a necessary being – from S5.)
3. It is not possible for a contingent concrete entity to cause the beginning of all contingency. (This is because the contingent concrete entity would already have to exist to cause contingency. In other words, an instance of contingency would be ‘prior to’ all instances of contingency, which is impossible.)
4. Thus, if there is no necessary concrete entity, then it is not possible for anything to cause all of contingency, which contradicts our initial thesis.
2. Then, it is impossible for a concrete necessary being to cause the beginning of all contingency. (This is because, if there is no necessary being, then it is not possible for there to be a necessary being – from S5.)
3. It is not possible for a contingent concrete entity to cause the beginning of all contingency. (This is because the contingent concrete entity would already have to exist to cause contingency. In other words, an instance of contingency would be ‘prior to’ all instances of contingency, which is impossible.)
4. Thus, if there is no necessary concrete entity, then it is not possible for anything to cause all of contingency, which contradicts our initial thesis.
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