In the last post, I mentioned that I’d eventually address alleged defeaters for Christian belief. A defeater is evidence that counts against a certain belief, in this case the truth of central Christian doctrines. There’s a few such alleged defeaters for Christianity; arguments targeting the coherence of the doctrine of original sin, the Trinity, the Atonement, and the historical reliability of the New Testament are usually proffered as such. We’ll defend the coherence of original sin in this post.
What’s the problem with original sin? It’s important to get clear on what the doctrine means. It isn’t merely the inheritance of a corrupt nature from Adam. It’s also the imputation of the guilt of Adam onto his descendants. We are not only born corrupt due to the sin of Adam, we’re born guilty and condemned for his sin. The difficulty of this doctrine is easy to see--we aren’t, in the ordinary course of life, guilty for the actions of other people. If Dianne lies to her husband, I’m clearly not responsible for her action. So why should we be guilty for Adam’s sin?
Here are two two attempts to defend the coherence of the doctrine. Both are speculative, one significantly more than the other. If they’re successful, they show the coherence of the doctrine. I have a strong preference for the latter one, but I think the first is fun and interesting to discuss.
Edwards’ Defense
The first attempt comes from Jonathan Edwards. To provide his answer, we first need to consider how we’re held guilty for any actions that have occurred in our own personal past. How am I guilty for an action that I did 10 years ago? The common-sense answer is that it's because I’m the same individual as I was 10 years ago. I’m the one that did the action, hence I'm responsible for it. But this self-identity across time puzzles Edwards as it has many other philosophers.
Christians traditionally believe that God created the world ex nihilo, out of nothing. Edwards believes this doctrine is relevant to the question of self-identity across time. He accepts creation ex nihilo but extends the doctrine to its limits. He holds that created reality is wholly dependent upon God in such a way that it must be constantly supported by him to continue to exist, and he takes this to imply that God creates the world anew at every moment ex nihilo. But given this view of creation, nothing exists for more than an instant. How, then, is there identity of an object across time? Nothing can exist for more than an instant, so the same object cannot continue to exist over a period of instants.
So the version of ‘myself’ that acted 10 years ago immediately went out of existence. I’m literally not identical to that version of myself from 10 years ago. We just treat my temporal splices across the many instances of time “as if [they] were one,” in the words of Jonathan Edwards. I am not, literally speaking, the same individual across time.
So our initial common-sense answer to our first question is wrong. I cannot be guilty on the basis of self-identity for an action 10 years ago because I, my current time splice, did not exist 10 years ago.
Edwards suggests that we’re held guilty for past actions given an arbitrary decree of God based upon his wisdom. So long as the various temporal slices of what we call “Daryl” across time share important qualities with each other, and so long as God decides to treat my various temporal splices “as if they were one,” then Edwards believes that we can justly hold my current self guilty for past actions.
Let’s apply this insight to the doctrine of original sin. Adam isn’t identical to me. But neither am I identical to myself from 10 minutes ago. If I can be held responsible for something that “I” did 10 minutes ago, then this suggests that I may also be held responsible for something done thousands of years ago if so arranged by God. In Edwards' view, I can be held as guilty for Adam’s sin as much as I am guilty for a sin that “I” did 10 minutes ago, so long as I share certain qualities with Adam and so long as God has decreed to treat us in this manner.
Here’s the argument schematized:
2. The only basis for treating a collection of time splices as if they were one is God’s will to do so.
3. It is thus possible for God to treat Adam and his posterity as a unity if he wills to do so.
4. God wills to treat Adam and his posterity as a unity, as revealed by Scripture and by our consent to Adam’s sin.
5. Therefore, we can be held responsible for Adam’s sin, because we can be held responsible for actions that are not literally our own.
Edwards' Defense is extremely speculative with high metaphysical costs. I do not find myself willing to accept those costs. But it is an illustrative example of a creative and brilliant Christian mind drawing on vast metaphysical resources to answer defeaters for the Christian faith. For those that may be drawn to the metaphysical picture required for Edwards’ defense, it may be an appealing defense.
William Lane Craig’s Defense
(a) federal headship
(b) God’s middle knowledge
I’ll explain each in turn.
Federal headship is a concept with which many Reformed readers should be familiar. It’s the idea that an agent can be appointed as our representative head, and that his actions as our head can be accounted as our own. The fate of those that the federal head represents is determined by how he acts. This agent stands before us on God’s behalf, and if he fails, we fail as well.
This doctrine, on its own, makes for a poor defense of original sin. Why should Adam be our representative? I didn’t choose him. Surely he can’t justly represent all of us. Perhaps if I were in his situation, I would have made the right decision. To answer such a line of reasoning, cue God’s middle knowledge.
God’s middle knowledge allows him to select a federal head that represents each and everyone of us accurately, by allowing him to know how each of us would have acted if we were placed in Adam’s position. God’s middle knowledge just is his knowledge of what we would do in every situation. I cannot rightly complain that I would have done differently in the garden. God knows I wouldn’t have. Adam is thus a good representative for me, as he acted as I would have acted.
Craig’s defense is dependent upon this two-stage strategy. We are held responsible for the sin of Adam because he is our federal head, and we cannot complain about Adam being a poor representative for us because God knows via his middle knowledge that we would have acted the same as Adam. Adam is thus a fitting representative for all of us.
Just as my senator represents me in congress, and this representation of me is just because I voted for him, so too is Adam our representative to God, and this is just because God knows I would have “voted” for Adam’s sin if I were there. This is a fantastic defense of the doctrine of original sin.
I do not, however, accept the doctrine of middle knowledge as Craig understands it. But I do believe that I can still make use of Craig’s defense with suitable qualifications. I’ll discuss in another post why I reject middle knowledge and what what qualifications I think should be made.
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