The Problem of Religious Pluralism

I think this problem canvasses more than one issue.  It can be taken as:

1.  How can we know the true religion given the great diversity of contradictory religions?

2.  If there are so many contradictory religions, surely this is indicative of an epistemic process that is not truth conducive. 

3.  Our religious beliefs seem to be determined by our culture, and not by truth conducive processes.

4.  What is the fate of the unevangelized? 

I think issue (3.) is a subspecies of issue (2.), but it’s pressed often enough on its own to warrant its own treatment.  

(1.) is easy enough.  We can (a) provide positive evidential arguments in favor of Christianity and (b) we can provide arguments for why other religions are either internally contradictory or make implausible claims.  We also have Reformed epistemology available to us which holds that other religions lack the relevant truth-conducive process that Christians possess, which is the testimony of the Holy Spirit.   

(2.)  Two approaches:  

The aforementioned point about Reformed epistemology could apply here--the diversity of religious opinions does not reflect the unreliability of a haywire process, but reflects the lack of a reliable process in other non-Christian religions.  That’s one way we could argue.  We could also hold with William Alston that other religions *do* in fact have a relatively reliable process, that other religions do, mostly, make and recognize correct claims, but that they fail to be entirely reliable and are missing central and important truths.  It seems that many religious traditions will make largely identical moral claims and also recognize the intuition that God should be defined as the Greatest Conceivable Being, but disagree about how this claim should be worked out.  These two different approaches to problem (2.) is reflective of a belief in two different processes in Reformed Epistemology: The Sensus Divinitatis, present in all humanity and underlying all religions--this is the approach of Alston just given, and that of the A/C Model, which is the idea that only Christians possess the unique process of the Testimony of the Holy Spirit, which is the former approach given.  

The fact that a process can oftentimes produce contradictory and inconsistent beliefs is not, by itself, enough to disavow that process as hopelessly unreliable.  Sense-perception is an example.  We often form contradictory beliefs of some observed event, yet we still take it that we can often work through the contradictory claims and survey the evidence to discern what actually happened.  This same point should be applied in the case of religion. 

(3.) As I said previously, this really seems to be a species of problem (2.).  But it’s been pressed often in popular atheistic culture: “You would have been a Muslim if you were born in Pakistan, therefore, your belief in Christianity is irrational.”  This is a clear example of the genetic-fallacy.  How I came to hold a belief is not relevant to the truth of that belief.  We can in fact turn this maneuver on its head:  If the skeptic were born in Pakistan, he probably would have been a Muslim--is his skepticism therefore irrational? 

Just because I probably would not have believed in the truths of calculus if I were born in the 13th century doesn’t undermine my current belief in the truths of calculus, so too should we apply this to the case of religious beliefs.  We can and should rationally evaluate our religious beliefs.

(4.) is a different breed, but I think it likely underlies most of the other problems.  It’s broad.  We can take WLC’s route:  God has arranged history so that no one is lost due to geographical accident--those that would have freely responded to the gospel will have the opportunity to do so.  God guarantees this with his Middle Knowledge.  Those that would not respond positively to the gospel are not guaranteed a hearing of it.  

Those of the unevangelized that are lost are not condemned for not responding to a gospel they never even heard, rather they’re condemned for their lack of a positive response to the revelation of God present in nature, which everyone possesses.  This lack of a positive response to God’s revelation in nature is universal as well as free (Rom. 1-2).

Or, we can take the route of C.S. Lewis, in which he affirms that the death of Jesus is absolutely required for salvation, but historical knowledge that Jesus died may not be required for salvation.  Job was presumably one of the elect, yet he lived hundreds of years before Jesus.  This same appoint applies to all of the OT saints.  Perhaps it was Job's belief that he required a mediator between him and God and believed that such a mediator would eventually arise (Job 19:25) that counted as saving faith--and maybe we can apply this same sort of opportunity to the rest of individuals in history who never heard the Gospel, even those after Christ.  

The Lewisian route is nice on the surface, but I think it suffers from clear violation of Scripture (namely, Rom. 1-2) and undermines the incentive to evangelize.  The Old Testament fathers were saved due to their faith in the promised Messiah, either through explicit prophecy, or through their attention to the cultic sacrifice ongoing in the temple, reminding them of their need for atonement [Note], and Christians are saved due to their faith in the fulfillment of those promises in Jesus. 

This problem is eased when we realize that God has no requirement to save any of us.  If God were to go and pardon a person on death roll, that does not necessitate him pardoning the rest on death roll.  It’s perfectly just for him to leave the others to their just and deserving faith, while still freely desiring to show mercy on some of those present.  As R.C. Sproul was keen to repeat, we shouldn’t ask “Why doesn’t God save everyone?,” but rather “Why does God save anyone at all?”  

[Note:] Was the promise of a Messiah something only knowable via special revelation and not through nature?--there's room for theorizing here, as Anselm seems to think that we can reach the conclusion that the atonement is necessary solely given reason and the assumption that God wishes to save some of us.  We may also hold that the gospel may *ordinarily* be required to turn the hearts of people, but that there may be exceptions.  Or perhaps the presentation of the gospel is just a particularly vivid method of communicating that moves people that would otherwise not be moved.  This would be a weakening of Lewis's claim, but at least a somewhat better fit with Scripture.  
We could still even hold to the truth of the Scriptural claim that those who reject the presentation of the gospel are thereby displaying their rejection of God:  "The one who rejects me and does not receive my words has a judge; the word that I have spoken will judge him on the last day."

It's important to keep in mind that the Gospel isn't merely about getting fire-insurance.  That's not the primary purpose of our relationship with God.  It's to enjoy and be with the Good now and here--the sooner, the better.