Against Presuppers, Again

(This is a companion piece, written in dialogue with presuppers, for my Presuppositionalism is Wrong)

Analysis of Neutrality:

Here are three possible and separate meanings for the concept of neutrality:

I. Neutral people, who are not for nor opposed to God.

II.  Neutral facts, or facts that do not point towards or pertain to God.

III. Neutral evidence, or evidence that does not, by itself, include a denial or affirmation of the existence of God.

As Calvinist, we clearly reject (I). As for (II), presuppers would reject it as well; “there are no neutral facts of this world that do not [. . .] pertain to God.” But I think I can accept this, and still hold to the possibility of neutrality in the sense of (III).  If neutrality in the sense of (III) exists, then I take it that presuppositionalism, as a unique and separate program, fails - for it depends on a rejection of type (III) neutrality to maintain its distinctiveness from other apologetic methodologies. 

For instance, I think that the design of the universe is evidence that God exists. Design implies complexity and purpose. But in pointing out the complexity and purpose of the universe, I am not automatically and directly pointing out God's existence. Instead, I’m saying that the complexity and purpose points beyond itself to the existence of God. We can separate out, mentally, the evidence that points to God’s existence from God’s existence itself. And if we can do this, then neutrality of type (III) exists and can be provided to the atheists *without* committing the Christian to assuming that God doesn’t or does exist in his argument. The complexity and purpose of the universe is a “neutral” ground in the sense of (III). Note that this reasoning allows me to affirm (II) without denying neutrality of type (III).

I think that these neutral facts of type (III) are evidential precisely because they do pertain to God, pointing towards his existence.  And I think that these facts can be accepted by the atheist, even granting his atheism, because they do not themselves include or deny the existence of God.  So if an atheist accepts these evidences, he thereby has evidential grounds for believing in God without thereby first assuming that God exists.  Even given his presupposition of atheism, he has evidence for God given these neutral facts that point to God.

If this sort of neutrality exists, then I can form arguments for God’s existence that do not contain his existence as a premise, that do not assume his existence.  I can form neutral arguments of type (III).  

On the Meaning of Ontic vs. Epistemic Starting Points:

Let me try to disambiguate what I mean by "epistemic" starting point:

By "epistemic" starting point I'm meaning to refer to a belief or experience of which the agent is *aware*, in their own mental life. This belief-awareness is what makes it epistemic rather than ontic.  By “starting point” I mean to refer to a belief or experience that confers justification to an agent’s beliefs in a basic way, that is, without depending on intervening beliefs or experiences.

Epistemic Starting Point:  An experience or belief, of which the agent is aware, that can confer justification on other beliefs, but itself doesn’t depend on other beliefs or experiences for its justification.  

An ontic starting point, on the other hand, is a state-of-reality that enables or explains some other facts about reality. There's no belief-awareness requirement for ontic starting points.

Ontic Starting Point:  A state-of-reality that is the first in a series of causal-explanations for some other facts about reality.  There is no awareness-requirement for ontic starting points.

Now, I grant that God is *both* an epistemic as well as ontic starting point as I've defined.  I do not grant that God is the sole epistemic starting point, (though he is the sole ontic starting point); I think that the other epistemic starting points can confer knowledge separately of an agent's awareness of God.

Now, I want to ask you: What do you mean when you say that God is the "epistemic precondition of knowledge"? Do you mean 'epistemic' as I've explained it? Or something else? Because if you mean it as I've explained it, I think you've obliterated the proximate starting points and reduced them all to one starting point, thereby denying the MSP Thesis, because you’re then requiring that agents be first aware of God’s existence prior to being able to know other items of knowledge.  And you've also got a difficult counterexample on your hand with the headache example; whereby it seems possible to know that one is experiencing a headache without knowing that God exists.

The Analysis of Knowledge:

So points below are a bit further afield from our current discussion, but I’m thinking they’re significant and wanted a place to put them down. Also the analysis is pretty deep and requires careful reading. So bear with me.  

We’re both going to reject that there are individuals who possess no justification for the belief in God’s existence.  We both accept, in some sense, that all humans possess the Sensus Divinitatis.  This fact clouds our ability to discuss whether agents must know first God in order to possess knowledge; because, presumably, you’re thinking that *everyone*, even the atheists and agnostics, know God, and this is how they also have other items of knowledge.

But my original W1 thought-experiment was meant to put forward a *true* agnostic (at least at the outset of their endeavor--they must come to belief in God through evidences), agents who do not possess immediate justification for the belief in God.  I don’t think these true agnostics exist, as I don’t think W1 is actual.  But I do think they’re possible, that is, that God could have created such agents who must come to believe in his existence on the basis of evidence alone.  Let’s call these agnostics “Poss-Agnostics,” agents who really do not have an immediate epistemic awareness of God’s existence.

Poss-Agnostic: An agent that does not have an immediate epistemic awareness of God’s existence.

Now, let’s bring in a theory of knowledge.  The traditional analysis of knowledge held that for an agent to possess knowledge they must possess a belief that is both justified and true.  So knowledge is justified, true, belief (JTB).   Justification comes in different flavors; probabilistic evidence, testimony, deduction, sense-experience.  Let’s say that I see that it’s 2:00 AM. Moreover, grant that my sensory-perception is reliable at producing true beliefs.  So I have justification for the belief that it’s 2:00 AM.  Moreover, I believe it.  Moreover, it’s actually *true* that it’s 2:00 AM.  If the JTB analysis is right, then I *know* that it’s 2:00 AM.  That’s it.  Nothing more is needed for me to be able to say that I know that it’s 2:00 AM.

What I *think* you're doing, though correct me if I’m wrong, is trying to add an additional requirement for knowledge; you’re trying to require, in order for knowledge to be obtained, that an agent also have an epistemic awareness of God.  Let’s call your analysis of knowledge JTB-G.  

I think part of the reason you may feel alright with adding the “-G” is due to the non-existence of Poss-Agnostics in our actual world.  Everyone does, in fact, have the “-G” due to the Sensus Divinitatis; that is, they have an awareness of God.  

But that’s a bad move, because our analysis of knowledge should be applicable across all possible worlds.  And the Poss-Agnostics do not possess an immediate awareness of God, so lack the “-G”, possessing, at the outset, merely JTB about those things they know.  Yet they do have knowledge.  So JTB-G is the wrong analysis of knowledge.  An immediate awareness of God’s existence is not required for knowledge.