A Construction Problem for Theism?

The Argument from Consciousness for theism (or against naturalism, depending on the version) proceeds on the basis of a construction problem:  Material objects are not the right sort of thing for constructing minds.  Given that this is the most plausible naturalistic theory for the origin of mind, our best alternative is to hold to a mind-first ontology.  This is supposed to support theism by showing that a fundamental mind like God precedes the material world and explains both matter and other minds.

But I think there may be a construction problem for classical theism, too.  Remember that CT holds that God creates everything out of nothing.  If it’s difficult to see how matter can be fashioned into a mind, then it certainly seems more difficult to see how nothing can be fashioned into a mind.  

But that’s too fast.  The creatio ex nihilo (CEN) doctrine does not hold that God fashioned some thing, called nothing, into creation.  It’s rather holding that, in the act of creation, God did not use what Aristotle called a material cause.  CEN more refers to the sequence of God’s act; God existed alone, and without using a material cause, created things distinct from himself.

But even in light of this response, it still seems that theism may still suffer from a construction problem.  One suggestion is to hold that God fashioned minds from his own minded self, using his own nature as the material cause.  That’d be a sort of creatio ex deo (CED) view, and, as I’ve argued elsewhere, violates strong commitments of CT and thus should be rejected.

So what is the Classical Theist to do?  First, I think it’s important to note that this particular “theistic construction problem” is just a part of the broader problem of how to conceive of CEN and whether CEN is possible at all.  I’ve argued elsewhere that CEN is both possible and coherent.  If we make this move, though, are we not giving up the game on the special construction problem for materialism?  Here’s one further move to think not, to think that we can still press the Argument from Consciousness:  Take it that consciousness is necessarily, of its own nature, more than mere material properties, and that material things are necessarily not conscious taken on their own.  These natures constrain God’s creative act.  Just as God could not have made water something other than H20, so too God could not make a merely material mind.  So even though God has the capacity to create objects out of nothing, not even God has the capacity to create a purely material object that is also conscious. We can still run a construction problem for material views of the mind.  

There’s a few steps required to successfully modify the Argument from Consciousness in light of what was said above, but I think this pushes the conversation forward.