An Objection to the Causal-Likeness Principle

My nephew presented a fun objection to the Causal-Likeness Principle (C-LP) the other day, and I wanted to take the time to respond to it.  

Recall that C-LP holds that a cause cannot give to its effects what it does not itself have in some way.  My nephew urged God's creation of the physical universe as a counter-example to the principle, in that God is not physical yet created physical reality.  Isn't this a case of a cause giving to an effect what it itself does not possess? 

Here's a suggestion to think otherwise.  Read "physical" as implying a limitation or a lack.  So God's lack of physicality is his lacking of a certain kind of limit, and with that in mind, here's the solution: God has presence.  In fact, he has the greatest amount of presence.  Physicality is just a limited presence.  So God is able to cause limited presences, as these are just lesser ways of being present.  So God creating a physical universe is not a counter-example to the C-LP.