Leibniz holds that the reality of independent creaturely activity is a necessary but not sufficient condition to ward off pantheism. It is not sufficient to refute pantheism, as a pantheist may quip that God’s parts could be active. This lies behind Leibniz's denial of Occasionalism.
Classical Theism holds that God creates things that are apart and external to God. But it also emphasizes the dependence of created things on God. Leibniz tried to strike a balance between these two principles by holding to a doctrine of concurrence.
If pantheism means that we are parts of God in the way that my hand is a part of my body, then we seem to have good reason for seeing pantheism as anathema.
Second, if creatures are not sufficiently independent of God, then the problem of evil seems insoluble - for evil is the responsibility of creatures, and not God.
Third, given Leibniz's Law, we only need to find a single property possessed by creation that is not possessed by God to deny their identity.
Fourth, it seems that if pantheism is true then some possibilities do not and will not exist. Spinoza’s necessitarianism looms on the horizon.
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