PDE and Calvinism

“I much prefer to say that if free will and determinism are compatible-and if determinism is true and if people do sometimes act freely-then there will, of necessity, be true counterfactuals of freedom and an omniscient being would, of necessity, have middle knowledge." - Peter van Inwagen

Sin is an intrinsic evil.  It is wrong to intentionally bring about intrinsic evils.  So God cannot intentionally bring about sin. So it looks like the Calvinist must say that God only intentionally brings about some good state of affairs that will result in sin, but only foresees the sin and does not intend it.  Some commentators have suggested the orderly and lawful nature of the universe as one such candidate for intentional willing, a candidate that God foresees, but does not intend, will result in sin.  There are probably other candidates.

As Heath White points out, “foreseeing” seems to entail causing and is stronger than mere permission, but weaker than intention.  But, given that God creates everything - the laws, the sequences, characters, effects, consequences, and so on - then it looks like we may have a problem drawing the intention/foresight distinction, for foresight seems to require causing a sequence that results in some evil unintentionally, but if God is responsible for every detail of the sequence, what causes what, and so on, then it seems like the evil may be bound up with his intentions.

The Molinist theodicist seems to have an advantage over the Calvinist in this sphere - for the CCFs constrain God’s creative ability, as he cannot force agents to freely will things. So it seems easier to draw the intention/foresight distinction on Molinism.

Yet the Leibnizian path that I’m fond of also has this advantage, and Heath White approaches the solution in this comment: “As for Molinism, I am not sure the Calvinist can’t take advantage of CCFs. (I’m very unclear here.) Suppose ‘If he were offered a $1m bribe, Curley would take it’ is true. Perhaps God cannot create *Curley* any other way.”