The ‘Aqedah and Kant

So there’s an additional problem in the ‘Aqedah - which is that Abraham should have been more sure of the moral prohibition against killing his innocent child than he was sure that the voice commanding him to kill his innocent child really was God’s voice.  We can call this the Kantian problem of the ‘Aqedah, as Kant clearly set forth the problem.

As Pruss notes in his paper, Abraham must have put an extremely high credence, perhaps close to 1, on the belief that it was God commanding him, else the action he undertook would be an immoral one.  But given Abraham’s epistemic environment wherein he had witnessed God’s action personally, along with other more general epistemic considerations - such as God providing the appropriate amount of assurance and evidence, externalism and such – then it doesn’t seem like a forlorn conclusion to hold that Abraham could have been so justified.  Plus the more general considerations that situate the ‘Aqedah, such as God’s right over our lives, the original sin of Isaac, the capacity of God to immediately resurrect him, Abraham’s belief that the action would be undone, etc.