Calvinistically Construed Middle Knowledge?

Middle Knowledge (MK) is a proposed category of God’s knowledge that’s meant to solve the tension of God providentially controlling a world filled with agents that possess robust libertarian free choice.  MK provides an avenue for God to exercise control of such a world via his knowledge of what a libertarian free agent would do in any given situation. God can figure out just what situations are needed for an agent to freely produce the result he desires in history.  

In other words, MK is meant to allow God to match the puzzle pieces of free choice with the outcome he desires in history.  

Calvinists reject Middle Knowledge.  I do as well.  I think the sort of free choice MK seeks to defend is incoherent, not necessary, and that it threatens God's aseity.  I may argue for those claims later, but not here.  I instead want to focus on a lesson that I think Calvinists can learn from MK without embracing it.

As I argued for here, we should embrace an amendment to Calvinism that enables it to accommodate a realm of creaturely reality that's prior to God's will.  Leibniz calls this the realm of the possibles, and it allows a concept of divine permission strong enough to preserve God's holiness in the face of creaturely sin.  Leibniz's model also rejects libertarian free-choice, evading its problematic implications.

This proposed amendment shares important similarities to MK.  It places a realm of reality prior to God's will, a property that it shares with MK (but it does this without violating his aseity as MK does, see above link).  We call this a pre-volitional view of providence.  It also enables God to select through possible creatures and match them with his desired world history.  MK tells a similar story.  These are benefits of MK that we should seek to uphold. But, given Leibniz's rejection of libertarian free-choice, Leibniz's amendment isn't identical to and should not be called MK.  Leibniz takes his proposed class of pre-volitional truths to reside in God's necessary knowledge and thus sees no reason to posit MK.

A handful of Calvinist theologians have recognized the importance of such an amendment.  Bruce Ware and Terrance Tiessen are two representative examples.  Both of them reached their position independently of Leibniz.  Both, however, erroneously used the term "Calvinistic Middle Knowledge."  Tiessen has thankfully abandoned that verbiage and proposed the term "Hypothetical Knowledge."  The term conveys the central idea of the Leibnizian model correctly, that God's creative decree is in view of pre-existent hypotheticals (possibles, in Leibniz's words).  

I think Tiessen's proposed term is useful and should be adopted.  But, strictly speaking, hypothetical knowledge cum determinism reduces to a subset within God's necessary knowledge. 

This is a dense post.