Why I Am Not an Evidentialist

William Alston took it that there are no good arguments that show the reliability of sense perception.  He spent many pages undermining arguments that attempt to show its reliability [see note].  Yet he (and the vast majority of us) accepted beliefs based on sense perception as rational.  Given the failure of arguments to show the reliability of sense perception, the only way to account for this rationality is by adopting an Externalist theory of justification.  An Externalist theory of justification holds that a process of which the agent is unaware and unable to defend may still provide the agent with justified and true beliefs, and if the process produces such beliefs that they may count as knowledge.  The process in question is our sensory equipment and the beliefs that it produces.  If it does so reliably, even if we're unable to show that it does so reliably, the output beliefs may count as knowledge.

We can apply the lesson learned here to the case of Christian belief.

Reformed Epistemology (RE) is the position that Christianity can be justified in a way analogous to the way that our beliefs derived from sense perception are justified.  Humans typically believe that there’s an external world, that there’s a table in front of us, etc., on the basis of our sense-perception.  I don’t accept these beliefs on the basis of argument, nor do I infer them from other premises -- rather, I just accept them in a basic way, that is, without argument.  And we typically take it that humans are rational in accepting such sensory beliefs in this manner.

Here’s the basic story that RE provides in order to show that Christian belief can be justified apart from argument:  

Christian belief can be warranted sufficient for knowledge if it is the output of a reliable process.  RE would say that this reliable process is the testimony of the Holy Spirit, which confers true beliefs upon believers.  We just found ourselves believing that Christianity is true.  This is analogous to sense-perception.  The testimony of the Holy Spirit makes you justified, though it may not be something that you’re able to use to show your justification.  In order to show your justification, you need to refer to the arguments. 

If RE is correct, then it shows that we can have the same sort of justification in believing Christianity as we have when we accept the output of our sense-perception.

This outcome is desirable for a few reasons, four of which are the following: (a) Christianity, to be justified, doesn’t require a formal grasp of philosophical arguments, and in this way we can say that our grandmothers and other laymen are justified in their Christian beliefs, and (b) philosophical argumentation probably isn’t a good basis for our Christian beliefs, as it oftentimes waxes and wanes as we meet objections, forget premises, tire of study, and so on (c) the average experience for a person becoming a Christian does not usually have much (if any) reference to the arguments (d) and, perhaps, though I don’t endorse the following (see here): if there are no good arguments for Christianity, then it may still be able to be justified regardless of this lack of evidence. 

Note: By showing the reliability of sense-perception, I don't mean that a particular belief based on sense perception cannot be corrected by another belief also based on sense perception.  For example, I thought I saw a car, but on further examination, I realized it was a bale of hay.  This is an example of an incorrect sensory belief being corrected by another sensory belief.  What I instead mean is that the global nexus of sensory belief cannot be shown to be reliable.  I mean to call to mind thought experiments such as the idea that I may be dreaming and thus my beliefs based on perception do not match up with an external world, or perhaps I'm a brain being manipulated by a scientist to have false sense perception.  These sorts of thought experiments question the global reliability of sense perception.  Trying to use sensory beliefs to show its reliability would be begging the question against this type of skeptic.