Does the Kalam Require A-Theory?

 As far as I know, the Kalam argument for God's existence doesn't work on a B-theory of time.  This allows the B-theorist to accept the first premise of the Kalam "P1: Whatever begins to exist has a cause for its existence," but deny that the universe began to exist, as there is no such thing as temporal becoming on B-theory.  

That the Kalam burdens itself with A-theory is a massive point against it.  Most academics reject A-theory.  And, as far as I know, WLC believes the the Kalam requires A-theory to work.

But I've seen some individuals propose that the Kalam can still work on a B-theory of time.   Here's the proposal, with its implications to the second premise spelled out: 

P1: Anything within time that has a moment "T1" at which it is indexed as having existence, plus no moments indexed as "prior to T1" at which it existed, has a cause; 
P2: The universe is within time and has a moment "T1" at which it is indexed as having existence, plus no moments indexed as "prior to T1" at which it existed.

Using the familiar ruler analogy for the B-theory of time, this suggestion argues that the universe exists "within" the ruler, say at the second inch, and that another unit precedes it--the first inch.  But this isn't the correct way to think about the universe and its relationship to time.  Even Augustine rejected that we should think of the universe as being created "within" time.  The correct way to see this relationship is by seeing the universe as being created "with" time.  Just as creating a cup creates ipso facto the rim of that cup, so too does creating the universe create time.  

This B-theory reformulation of the Kalam doesn't work.  The Kalam can still only be as powerful as the arguments for A-theory.