Rejoinder to the B-theory Objection to the Kalam

I’ve come across some new information that discredits a central claim that I made in my last post.  William Lane Craig does not take B-theory to be fatal to the Kalam.  Alexander Pruss, Calum Miller, and Robert Koons also take it that Kalam is compatible with B-theory. 

Here’s WLC in his own words:  

"[Would KCA go through if B-theory is true?] 

Well, I would give up the second philosophical argument based on the possibility of forming an actual infinite by successive addition.  

And I would have to redefend the causal premise in such a way that it doesn't appeal to something's coming-into-being without a cause, but rather just say that something can't begin to exist without a cause.  The scientific evidence for the finitude of the past would still go in place.

So even though the abandonment of an A-theory of time would damage the argument and cause you to reformulate some of its support, it wouldn't be fatal."

And a quote by Pruss: "There is temporal becoming on the B-theory. An object comes into being provided that it exists but didn't use to exist." We'd then reformulate the causal premise in light of this.

Pruss's adoption of the Kalam argument as he presents in his book Infinity, Causation, and Paradox has such a reformulation: "Like the Kalam argument, our argument denies the existence of backwards-infinite sequences. But the details are quite different. The Kalam argument opposes sequences that are temporally backwards-infinite, while the present argument denies all causally backwards-infinite sequences."