Classical Theism and Extrinsic Relations

These are just some preliminary thoughts on the debates going on over Classical Theism (CT) between R.T. Mullins and Ed Feser.  I just want to stress the tentative nature of my comments.  

R.T. Mullins argues that, according to the tradition of Classical Theism, God cannot undergo Cambridge change as that would imply that he is in time.  He argues that the tradition of Classical Theism denied that God has extrinsic relations.  He depends on Paul Helm, among others, for this assertion.  But the strength of the assertion depends on how we understand "change."  If the b-theory is right, there's a kind of temporal becoming -  An object comes into being or changes provided that it exists but didn't used to exist.  

And yet the B-theory of change seems compatible with saying that God is timeless and experiences Cambridge change, at least if change is understood along the lines of B-theory temporal becoming.  It isn't a change in respect to God, as he sees the eternal block statically.  But it is a temporal becoming of the creature. 

Again, Mullins is somewhat mischaracterizing Helm in that Helm is supposing that Cambridge change understood in the A-theory sense is impossible for God to experience as a timeless being. The problem with Cambridge change is the "change" bit, not the external relations bit.  

R.T. Mullins is also insistent that Classical Theism denies that God can have extrinsic properties.  This would be disastrous for the tradition if true.  But I doubt that it is true.  Here’s a quote from Aquinas: “Thus there is nothing to prevent these names which import relation to the creature from being predicated of God temporally, not by reason of any change in Him, but by reason of the change of the creature; as a column is on the right of an animal, without change in itself, but by change in the animal.” - Summa Theologica, question 13, article 7. 

Perhaps the tradition is inconsistent on this point.  This depends on whether Mullins' citations that he believes show that the tradition denies extrinsic relations can withstand scrutiny.  I've only checked his Augustine citations, and it does seem like Mullins has a decent chance of misunderstanding Augustine on this score.  Still, even if the tradition is inconsistent, a modern proponent of Classical Theism can just choose to excise the inconsistent elements of the tradition and hold onto the more plausible bits, and yet claim to be within the tradition.  

But really, I'm not *too* interested in the historical interpretative question.  I would really rather know whether Classical Theism can stand on its own.