The Problem of Temporary Intrinsics

Leibniz’s Law holds that identity requires indiscernibility, that is, that "two" purportedly identical objects must share all of "their" properties in common for "them" to be identical.  But we assume that identical objects can have varying properties at different temporal points in their existence.  This is known as the problem of Temporary Intrinsics.  

The solution to this problem that I prefer is known as perdurantism.  It holds that some object, let’s say Daryl, at t is not identical to Daryl at t+1, and that Daryl simpliciter is not identical to either Daryl at t or Daryl at t+1.  Instead, Daryl at t and Daryl at t+1 are mere parts of Daryl, and parts of an object can have different properties without violating Leibniz’s Law.

If we combine perdurantism with trope theory, we can say that my existence at various times is a trope of me.  I am, fundamentally, a four-dimensional object with the various temporal existences as tropes of me.

This move better preserves the Aristotelian insight that wholes ground their parts, rather than parts grounding the wholes.